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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ANGEL JOSEPH MARTINEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20001128-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(i) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an 
appeal from a final order involving a conviction of a first degree felony. Appellant was 
convicted of Murder, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(d) (1999), and 
Aggravated Burglary, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1989), both first degree 
felonies. 
1 
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
I. Whether the introduction of the eyewitness identification violated the Appellant's 
right to due process of law under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the 
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because the identification was 
unreliable and impermissibly suggestive. 
Standard of Review: The court on appeal reviews the factual findings underlying the trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous 
standard. The court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based on these facts under 
a correctness standard. State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991)). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved for appeal by the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress the eyewitness identification of Dikkie Jo Black prior to trial. (See Addendum 
B). A suppression hearing on this motion was held on January 14, 2000 before the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis. (R. 325) 
II. Whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant"s Motion for Mistrial when 
the prejudicial hearsay testimony of Anita Archuleta was admitted even though the 
defense was not aware of the information Archuleta testified to until it was elicited by the 
prosecution upon redirect examination at trial. 
Standard of Review: The standard or review for rulings on a motion for mistrial is abuse 
of discretion of the trial court. See State v. Hav. 859 P.2d 1 (Utah 1993). 
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Preservation: This issue was preserved for appeal by the Defendant's hearsay objection to 
Archuleta's response on redirect examination. (R. 328:105) This issue was further 
preserved by the Defendant's Motion for a Mistrial based on the State's failure to provide 
the Defendant with all of the investigatory documents in the Prosecution's possession. 
(R. 328:147) 
III. Whether the State failed to provide sufficient evidence for a jury to convict the 
Defendant of Murder and Aggravated Burglary. 
Standard of Review: A conviction will be reversed if the evidence is sufficiently 
"inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved for appeal by a Motion to Dismiss at the 
conclusion of testimony. (R. 337:7) This Motion to Dismiss was based on the 
insufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. CONST, AMEND. XIV, SECTION 1 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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UTAH CONST, ART. I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
See Addendum B 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 9, 1999, the Defendant, Angel Joseph Martinez ("Martinez") was 
charged with murder, a first degree felony and aggravated burglary, also a first degree 
felony. Further, a sentencing enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 was 
included with each of the two charges based upon the use of a deadly weapon. A 
sentencing enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 alleging that Martinez 
acted in concert with two or more people was also included with each of the two charges. 
Defense counsel filed a Motion to Suppress the eyewitness identification which was heard 
at an evidentiary hearing on January 14,2000. (Addendum A) At that time the trial court 
denied Martinez's Motion to Suppress Eyewitness Identification and signed the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with its ruling on February 16,2000. 
(Addendum C) The matter was tried before a jury that found Martinez guilty of the 
charged offenses on June 22,2000. The Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on 
November 20,2000. (R. 311). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 3:20 p.m. on August 3, 1999, Matthew Moya ("Moya") and his 
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family returned to their home after going to the store. (R. 328:85) Moya went directly to 
a bedroom in the back of the house to lie down while the rest of his family stayed in the 
front room. (R. 328:85) About ten minutes after Moya and his family arrived at home, 
two men entered the house and yelled to the other occupants to get on the floor. (R. 
328:85). One of the men went back to the room where Moya was located and a struggle 
ensued. (R. 328:85) Moya was shot three times before the two men left the house. (R. 
328:85-86) 
t)own the street from the Moya home, Dikkie Jo Black ("Black") was picking her 
children up from Sandy Waters' house, her babysitter. (R. 328:112) While Black was 
talking to the babysitter outside on the walkway, she noticed two men running down the 
street. (R. 328:112) Black thought this was strange because it was August and one of the 
men was wearing a black sweatshirt with the hood up. (R. 328:112) Black continued to 
watch them run around the corner and down the street. (R. 328:113) About that same 
time, Black noticed a green car slowly driving towards the two men who then got in. (R. 
328:113) Black was able to see the driver for a few moments before it turned the comer. 
Black tried to get a license plate number but was only able to ascertain that the car had 
Utah centennial arch plates. (R. 328:113) 
Immediately following the shooting, Black was asked to give descriptions of the 
two men she saw running down the street, the driver, and the vehicle. (R. 328:125) 
Black initially described the driver as between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, 
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Hispanic, with dark shiny skin, short black hair and dark eyes. (R. 328:126) On August 
5, 1999, two days after the shooting, Black was visited by Detective Guy Yoshikawa and 
was asked to identify the man she saw driving the car in a photo spread. (R. 328:127) 
Detective Yoshikawa first showed Black a black and white spread with six photos of men 
matching the description Black gave the police except that all of the men were in their 
thirties and not in the age range Black had given the police at the scene. (R. 328:128, 
329:226) Black recognized the eyes of one of the men in the photo spread, but was not 
certain that this was the driver of the car. (R. 328:129) Detective Yoshikawa then 
showed Black a colored copy of the photo spread. (R. 328:130) Each photo was then 
isolated. Black selected the top middle picture, Angel Martinez, as the man she believed 
was possibly the driver. (R. 328:130) 
At trial, Black testified regarding the identification, noting that there were some 
differences between the picture that she selected from the photo spread and the 
description she initially gave the police. (R. 328:132) Black described the driver as 
having a smooth, shiny face and white teeth, both contrary to the actual physical 
appearance of Martinez. (R. 328:133) Most notably, Black described the man she saw 
driving the car as approximately eighteen to twenty-five years old, much younger than the 
six men in the photo spread Detective Yoshikawa prepared and showed Black for 
identification. (R. 328:128). 
At trial, Black also testified about the vehicle that she witnessed the two men jump 
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into and then drive away. She described it as a lime green, long, boxy, four-door car. 
Black was unable to get the license plate number but was able to ascertain that it had the 
Utah centennial arch plates. (R. 328:134) 
There was additional testimony at trial regarding the vehicle that was allegedly 
seen picking up the two men as they exited the Moya home. The prosecution presented 
the testimony of Roger Barney, the owner or A Fast Towing. Barney testified that he sold 
Martinez a 1977 four-door, two-tone green Cadillac Fleetwood in April of 1999. (R. 
329:43) He further testified that he later saw the aforementioned car at Evans & Sons 
Automotive in a pile of crushed cars. (R. 329:44) 
Steven Evans, owner of Evans & Sons Automotive testified that sometime in the 
afternoon on or about the 3rd of August, 1999, Martinez brought in a green 1977 Cadillac 
Fleetwood to be scraped or junked. (R. 329:58-60) 
Approximately one week after the Cadillac was brought in for scrapping, Evans 
received a telephone call from Rebecca Kelly, Martinez9 girlfriend, inquiring as to the 
status of the car. (R. 329:61) Evans informed her that the car was in a pile with other 
scrapped cars waiting to go to the scrap yard. (R. 329:62) In October 1999, an 
investigator from the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office came to the lot and inquired 
about the Cadillac. (R. 329:62-63) At trial, the prosecutor argued that the car's engine 
was not damaged and that the only reason Martinez brought the car to the lot was to 
destroy any potential link between Martinez and the shooting at the Moya home. (R. 
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329:63-67) 
There was also trial testimony from Matthew Moya's fiancee, Anita Archuleta, an 
eyewitness to the shooting. (R. 328:84) Archuleta recounted the shooting and provided a 
description of one of the shooters. (R. 328:85, 88-92) On cross-examination, defense 
counsel questioned Archuleta about the name she gave investigators as someone she 
thought might be involved. (R. 328:102) Archuleta testified that she indicated that Moya 
may have owed Jose Nava some money as a result of some prior dealings. (R. 328:102) 
On redirect examination, the prosecution further questioned Archuleta regarding a 
connection between Jose Nava and Moya. (R. 328:104) The State asked Archuleta if she 
knew whether Jose Nava and Angel Martinez were friends. (R. 328:104) Archuleta 
testified that Moya had told her that Martinez and Nava had called a couple of times. (R. 
328:104-105) Defense counsel objected to this statement as hearsay and the objection was 
sustained. (R. 328:105). Archuleta then testified that to her knowledge, Martinez had 
personally made one of the calls. (R. 328:105) 
After the jury was dismissed on the first day of trial, the Defendant made a Motion 
for a Mistrial. (R. 328:147). The basis for this motion was that although the defense had 
opened the door for testimony regarding a relationship between Moya and Nava, this was 
done without any information of a connection between the Moya-Nava relationship and 
the Defendant. (R. 328:148) Further, because of this lack of information, the Defendant 
objected to the hearsay after it was uttered by the witness and thus heard by the jury. (R. 
8 
328:147-149). It was later established that the State had failed to provide the Defendant 
with a crucial police report that contained the information regarding the Nava-Moya-
Martinez connection. (R. 328:154) The trial court summarily denied the Defendant's 
Motion for a Mistrial. (R.328:154) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
To be admissible in a court of law, the identification of a defendant must be 
reliable and procured in a manner that is not suggestive. Black's identification was 
obtained in a highly suggestive manner and was not reliable due to the short time that she 
had to observe the driver of the vehicle and the nature of her observation. The 
introduction of Black's eyewitness identification of Martinez violated his right to due 
process of law under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Defendant's Motion for a Mistrial should have been granted due to the 
prejudicial nature of the testimony that was heard by the jury. The Defendant 
unintentionally opened the door to the line of questioning regarding a connection between 
Moya and Martinez because this information was contained in a report that the State 
failed to provide to the Defense. The hearsay testimony of Archuleta was unreliable and 
prejudicial and incapable of disregard with a curative instruction. The Defendant was 
greatly prejudiced at trial by this testimony and the Motion for a Mistrial should have 
been granted. 
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The evidence presented by the State was not sufficient for the jury to conclude that 
Martinez was guilty of the crimes of Aggravated Burglary and Murder as he was charged. 
The eyewitnesses were unable to say with absolute certainty that Martinez was the man 
that they saw driving the vehicle observed leaving the scene. Further, the evidence 
regarding the destruction of the vehicle around the same time as the August 3, 1999 
incident was purely circumstantial and not conclusive, therefore an inadequate basis for a 
guilty verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INTRODUCTION OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
VIOLATED MARTINEZ'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Due to the high potential for mistaken identification, in order for a photo 
identification to be constitutional and therefore admissible at trial, the process must be 
one that is free of suggestion. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). The manner in 
which the State obtained the eyewitness testimony was overly suggestive thus making the 
testimony unreliable. 
Immediately following the shooting, the police obtained information from some 
individuals that witnessed the men and the car leaving the scene. One witness, Dikkie Jo 
Black described the man she saw driving the vehicle as a male Hispanic, with dark hair, 
white teeth, smooth skin and between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. (R. 328:126) 
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Black did not note any unusual characteristics at that time. (R. 325:52) 
The officers that obtained the eyewitness identification prepared a photo spread 
with photos six men meeting the general description that was initially provided by Black, 
except that the men were approximately between the ages of thirty and thirty-seven, 
significantly older than the originally described eighteen to twenty-five age range. (R. 
325:26) A picture of Martinez was placed in the number two spot on the middle of the 
top row which is typically the space in a photo array that the suspect is placed in. (R. 
325:32) 
Prior to the photo identification, Detective Yoshikawa called Black and asked her 
if the man she saw driving the vehicle could be older that eighteen to twenty-five, to 
which she responded that it was a possibility. (R. 325:23) On August 5, 2000, two days 
after the shooting, Detective Yoshikawa visited Black at her home and asked her to 
identify the man she saw driving the car in the aforementioned photo spread. (R. 325:23) 
Detective Yoshikawa told Black that they had a possible suspect and that he may or may 
not be included in the spread. (R. 325:23) Black looked at the spread for approximately 
one to two minutes and selected Martinez as the person she thought was possibly the 
driver. (R. 325:24) Black noted that while there were many similarities, there were also 
some dissimilarities such as the texture of the skin. (R. 325:56) Ultimately, Black was 
unable to state with certainty that the photo she selected was the man she saw driving the 
vehicle. (R. 329:28) 
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A. Martinez was denied his right to federal due process 
because the identification procedure used was overly suggestive 
and therefore unreliable. 
In State v. Thamer. 777 P.2d 432,435 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that under federal due process, any array may be closely scrutinized to determine whether 
the identification was so impermissibly suggestive that it undermines the confidence in 
any subsequent in-court eyewitness identification. 
The federal constitutional standard requires that the trial court, when confronted 
with an issue of the admissibility of an eyewitness identification, must preliminarily 
determine whether the identification is sufficiently reliable that its admission and 
consideration by the jury will not deny the defendant due process. The court is to 
consider all the circumstances when coming to this decision, including five factors that 
were identified by the United States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers. 409 U.S. 188, 93 
S.Ct.375,34L.Ed.2d401 (1972). 
These factors, which are important to a determination of the reliability of an 
identification, include: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time 
of the crime, (2) the witness5 degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness9 prior 
description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 
Biggers. 409 U.S. at 199. See also Thamer. 777 P.2d at 426; State v. Wulffenstein. 657 
P.2d 289, 291-292 (Utah 1982); State v. Malmrose. 649 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982); State v. 
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McCumber. 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 1980). 
An analysis of these factors demonstrates that the identification and testimony of 
Dikkie Jo Black should not have been admitted at trial. The first factor to be considered 
under the federal due process analysis is the opportunity of the witness to view the 
Defendant at the time of the crime. Black testified that the car first came speeding around 
the comer, exceeding the posted speed limit of twenty-five miles per hour. (R. 328:117) 
She then testified that the car slowed down, close to where she was standing, for the two 
other men to jump in. (R. 328:117) It was at that point that Black testified to have first 
established eye contact with the driver and then maintained that contact for approximately 
ten to fifteen seconds, while the car speed up and rounded another comer. (R. 328:118) 
Black stood on the driveway of her babysitter's home while she observed the driver of the 
car. The car was moving the entire time she had eye contact with him. (R. 328:117) 
Black did not have sufficient opportunity to observe the driver because he was enclosed 
in a vehicle that was moving and was several feet away from where she was standing. 
Therefore, Black's identification is insufficient under the first factor because of the 
limited and disrupted opportunity she had to observe the driver. 
The second factor the court is to consider is the witness' degree of attention. At 
trial, Black testified that there were several things happening simultaneously. Black was 
observing the men running down the street then subsequently jumping into the car. (R. 
328:118) Black was also telling her children to get into her vehicle for safety because she 
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thought that there might be a shooting involving the two men running and the driver of 
the vehicle. (R. 328:113) Black was experiencing all of this while she claimed to be 
maintaining eye contact with the driver. Because of the all the commotion, the witness's 
degree of attention to the driver of the vehicle was divided and therefore not adequate 
under the second prong of the analysis. 
The third factor is the accuracy of the witness' prior identification. There were 
several discrepancies between the initial description Black gave the police and the man in 
the photo she identified as the driver, the most notable difference being age. Black 
initially described the driver as "younger," (R. 329:112) between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-five (R. 328:126) or early twenties. (R. 329:13) Martinez and the other men in 
the photos shown to Black in the photo array were all in their thirties, a possible age 
difference of up to twenty years. This major inaccuracy in description demonstrates the 
unreliability of the eye witness identification and the resulting unconstitutional nature of 
the testimony. 
The fourth factor to be considered is the level of certainty of the witness. Black 
testified at trial that she could not say with absolute certainty that the man whose photo 
she selected out of the array was the driver of the car, nor could she testify that Martinez 
was the man that she saw. 
The final factor is the length of time between the crime and the identification. 
Here, there were two days between the shooting and the photo identification of Martinez. 
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This two day lapse was a sufficient period in which the witness's impressions regarding 
the physical appearance of the driver could diminish. Due to the length of time between 
the crime and the identification, the eyewitness testimony was unreliable and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
An analysis of the five factors the United States Supreme Court laid out in Biggers 
demonstrates that the eyewitness testimony of Dikkie Jo Black was not reliable. Black 
was not able to observe the suspect for a significant period of time nor was her attention 
undivided. There were several discrepancies between her initial description of the driver 
and the photo she selected as the man she saw. Further, Black was not able to say to 
testify with certainty that the man whose photo she selected was the same man she saw 
driving the car. Finally, there was too much time between the crime and the identification 
so the witness had to rely on a deteriorating impression. Pursuant to the federal due 
process analysis, the eyewitness identification should have suppressed thus making the 
subsequent trial testimony inadmissible. Admission of Black's identification and the 
subsequent trial testimony therefore violated Martinez's right to due process under the 
federal constitution. 
B. The method used to obtain the eyewitness identification 
of Martinez violated his due process rights under the 
Utah State Constitution. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah State Constitution provides, "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
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Martinez was denied this right to due process when the trial court allowed the unreliable 
eyewitness identification and trial testimony of Black. The manner in which the 
identification was obtained was highly suggestive and therefore a violation of Martinez's 
due process rights granted in the Utah Constitution. 
The Utah Supreme Court set out the analytical model to be used to determine 
whether eyewitness testimony should be admitted at trial pursuant to article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). The question that is 
ultimately to be determined is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
identification was reliable. There are five factors set out in Long that must be used in 
determining the reliability of an identification. The pertinent factors include the 
following: 
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; 
(2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; 
(3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; 
(4) whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and 
(5) the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. 
This last area includes such factor as whether the event was an ordinary one in the 
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mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether race of the actor was 
the same as the observer's. Long, 721 P.2d at 493. These factors vary slightly from those 
of the federal due process analysis stated by the Supreme Court in Biggers. in that the 
state model emphasizes the totality of the circumstances surrounding the identification 
whereas the federal model does not. 
With the totality of circumstances approach, the Utah Constitution due process 
analysis also looks at the actual event witnessed and how that may effect the witness's 
ability to accurately relate what happened. At the suppression hearing, Black testified 
that while observing the two men running down the street, she thought there was going to 
be a shooting or something of that nature. (R. 325:38) She was worried about her 
children's safety and ordered them to get into her car for protection. (R. 325:38) Black 
was observing and experiencing several things simultaneously which impaired her ability 
to accurately perceive and ultimately relate what or who she saw. 
Studies have shown that when an observer is experiencing a high degree of stress, 
such as Black was in this instance, perceptual abilities are known to decrease 
significantly. Long. 721 P.2d at 489, citing F. Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? 
Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 
Stan. L. Rev. 969, 979 n.29 (1977). Further, in addition to any emotional impairment 
Black may have experienced, the ability to identify a suspect was limited to what she was 
able to observe for only seconds. This short period of observation may have effected 
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Black's ability to accurately relate exactly what she saw. 
Another element to consider under the Utah due process analysis is whether the 
eyewitness identification is spontaneous or the product of suggestion. When Black gave 
her initial description of the man she saw driving the car, she described him as "younger," 
(R. 329:112) "between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five." (R. 328:126) Before 
Detective Yoshikawa showed her the photo array, he asked her if it was conceivable the 
man she saw was actually older than the range she had previously provided, to which she 
responded that it was a possibility. (R. 325:23) 
The photo array was prepared using photos of Hispanic men, all of which were in 
their thirties, exceeding the age range given by Black. (R. 325:26) Before Detective 
Yoshikawa met with Black, he told her that a name had arisen and asked her whether she 
was still able to identify the driver. (R. 325:28) Black looked at the pictures for a few 
minutes and identified Martinez as the man she thought was probably the driver, noting 
some dissimilarities, such as the texture of the skin. (R. 325:24) Black was never given 
an opportunity to look at a photo array of possible drivers meeting the description she 
gave. 
This array was overly suggestive. Because the police first asked Black if the 
driver could have been older, then only showed her photos of men up to twenty years 
older than her description, it was suggested to her that the police had a suspect that was in 
his thirties and that was in the spread. Therefore, this eyewitness identification was the 
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result of suggestion and not reliable. The eyewitness identification fails the Utah 
Constitution due process analysis and was therefore not admissible at trial. 
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL BECAUSE PREJUDICIAL HEARSAY 
TESTIMONY WAS HEARD BY THE JURY AS A RESULT OF THE 
STATE'S FAILURE TO FULLY COMPLY WITH UTAH RULE OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16. 
Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a prosecutor has a 
duty to disclose to the defense certain materials or information of which he has 
knowledge. This includes "any item the court determines on good cause shown . . . in 
order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense." Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(5). 
Further, "[i]f at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention 
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party 
to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from 
introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under 
the circumstances." Utah R. Crim. P. 16(g). 
In addition to the initial disclosures, the prosecution has a duty to make disclosures 
on a continuing basis, even without a specific request from the defendant. Parsons v. 
Galetka. 57 F.Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Utah 1999). On August 16, 1999, the Defendant made 
an initial Request for Discovery at the outset of the case. (Addendum D) The State 
intended to provide the Defendant with all of the information in its possession but failed 
to produce a police report wherein Anita Archuleta stated that she was aware of telephone 
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conversations between the Defendant and Matthew Moya. 
The Defendant's Motion for a Mistrial should have been granted due to the 
prejudicial effect of the hearsay testimony that was heard by the jury. The Defendant was 
not aware that asking Archuleta about a connection between Nava and Moya would elicit 
hearsay testimony of a connection between Moya and Martinez. The Defendant 
immediately objected to Archuleta's answer as hearsay, but the jury had already heard the 
statement. 
The trial court has the discretion to remedy any prejudice to a party resulting from 
a breach of the criminal discovery rules. State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415 (Utah 1989). 
Here, the remedy sought by the Defendant was a mistrial. Granting of this motion was 
within the discretion of the trial court. The State did not meet its obligation to provide the 
defendant with any information in its possession that may aid in the preparation of his 
defense. Further, there is no way that the Defendant would have been able to discover 
this information regarding the phone call believed to have been made by Martinez to 
Moya though his own investigation. 
The prejudicial impact of Archuleta's statement resulting from the discovery 
violation could not be cured by a jury instruction to disregard testimony. Unacceptable 
prejudice to the Defendant remained and therefore the trial court should have granted the 
Defendant's mistrial motion. See State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). 
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Ill THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT FOR THE JURY TO BASE A 
FINDING OF GUILT TO THE CHARGES OF AGGRAVATED 
BURGLARY AND MURDER. 
This Court must reverse a conviction for lack of evidence when the evidence is so 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. State v. Giles. 966 P.2d 872, 
876 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Here there was no reliable or conclusive evidence to support a 
finding of guilt on the charges of aggravated burglary and murder. 
At trial, the State presented the following evidence: 
1. On August 3, 1999, two men entered the home of Matthew Moya, fired three 
shots and exited the home minutes later. (R. 328:85-86) 
2. The men got into a green vehicle that was observed driving down the street 
slowly. (R. 328:113) 
3. An eyewitness, Dikkie Jo Black, observed a Hispanic male between eighteen 
and twenty-five years old with dark shiny skin, short black hair, and dark eyes driving the 
vehicle. (R. 328:126) Black was not able to testify with certainty that the man she saw 
driving the car was Martinez. (R. 329:28) 
4. The vehicle was witnessed leaving the scene by three individuals who testified 
at trial. (R. 328:134, 328:23, 328:57) The car was described by Ken Rosenbaum as a 
"nice-looking car," (R. 328:23) "green" (R. 328:23) and "an '84, '85 Cadillac" (R. 
328:24). Jay Ingleby described the car as "a '77 to '80 Cadillac, dark green top" the 
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bottom a "kind of lighter green." (R. 328:56) Dikkie Jo Black also saw the car and 
testified that "it was a long, bulky, green, square older-type car" with four doors. (R. 
328:117) 
5. In April of 1999, Roger Barney sold Martinez a two-tone green, 1977 Cadillac 
Fleetwood. (R. 329:43) The twenty-two year old car had not had its engine replaced at 
any time prior to the sale of the car to Martinez. (R. 329:48) 
6. Sometime in the first part of August, in the late afternoon, Martinez took his 
1977 Cadillac Fleetwood to Evans & Sons Automotive to be scraped claiming that the 
engine was bad. (R. 329:58-60) 
It was never argued that Martinez was one of the men that entered the house and 
fatally shot Moya, therefore in order to convict Martinez of murder under the accomplice 
liability statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202, the State had the burden of proving beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Martinez (1) intentionally or knowingly participated in the killing, 
(2) intended that the shooter cause serious bodily injury to Moya, or (3) acted under 
circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life. State v. Hoi gate, 2000 UT 
74, 20 P.3d 346. The State failed to provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 
find Martinez guilty of murder. 
In order for the jury to convict Martinez of aggravated burglary, the State had to 
satisfy the requirements of the accomplice liability statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. 
The State had to prove that Martinez was acting "with the mental state required for the 
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commission of aggravated burglary and that he "solicited], requested], commanded], 
encourage[d], or intentionally aid[ed]ff the shooters in the commission of aggravated 
burglary. Holgate. 2000 UT 74, f 25, quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. Again, the 
State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Martinez was in fact the driver or 
that he intentionally aided the shooters in entering the Moya home and intended that they 
commit a felony or an assault once inside. Id. 
A. The eyewitness identification and testimony presented at trial was 
unreliable and therefore not sufficient for a guilty verdict. 
As established in the previous section, the admission of the eyewitness 
identification and testimony provided by Dikkie Jo Black was violative of the Martinez's 
right to due process of law under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the 
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The process in which the 
identification was obtained was unreliable and impermissibly suggestive. Further, the 
witness was not able to identify Martinez as the driver of the car with absolute certainty. 
Due to the unconstitutional nature of the identification, the testimony should not have 
been admissible and was therefore an improper basis for which the jury could make a 
guilty finding. 
B. The evidence regarding the destruction of the vehicle thought to be used in 
the crime was merely circumstantial and inconclusive, therefore alone not 
an adequate basis on which to find Martinez guilty of the charges of 
aggravated burglary and murder. 
Circumstantial evidence is admissible, and reasonable inferences may be drawn 
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therefrom, but the court must still determine whether the "evidence to support the verdict 
was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable." State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, ^ [19, 999 P.2d 565 (quoting Child v. Gonda. 
972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998)). 
The circumstantial evidence regarding the destruction of Martinez's vehicle 
around the same time as the crime is so slight and immaterial that the jury could not have 
found Martinez guilty of murder and aggravated burglary beyond a reasonable doubt 
because he gave his car to an automotive company for scrap within a few days of the 
incident. The State never conclusively established that it was Martinez's car that 
witnesses saw on August 3, 1999, nor were they able to provide reliable evidence that 
Martinez was in fact the driver. 
The State presented evidence inferring that Martinez was involved in the shooting 
as the getaway driver. The State provided testimony of witnesses describing a car 
meeting the same general description of Martinez's 1977 Cadillac Fleetwood. The State 
then attempted to prove that Martinez took his vehicle to be scrapped after the shooting in 
order to destroy any evidence that might link him to the crime. 
The State's witnesses were not able to conclusively testify regarding the actual 
date the vehicle was brought in. (R. 329:75-76) Further, the owner of Evans & Sons 
Automotive, the lot the Defendant brought the car to be scrapped, was not able to 
determine that car was running fine, without any engine problems, when Martinez 
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brought it in. 
C. The alleged confession of Martinez to a man in the same holding cell at the 
courthouse was not competent testimony and was therefore an improper 
basis for a guilty verdict. 
At trial, the Prosecution also provided questionable testimony that in September of 
1999, Martinez confessed to his involvement in the Moya shooting when this witness and 
Martinez were both in the holding facilities at the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse. The 
witness, Roger Ashworth, recognized Martinez from his associations with the victim, 
Matthew Moya. (R. 329:187) Ashworth claimed that Martinez initiated a conversation 
about their respective charges and that Martinez told him that he was in there for the 
murder of Moya. (R. 329:188) Ashworth also claimed that Martinez said that he was just 
there for the ride but he was getting charged with the murder. (R. 329:188) Ashworth 
said that Martinez told him that Martinez's brother had a dispute with Moya and so he 
transported him to Moya's house. (R. 329:189) Ashworth then testified that he explained 
to Martinez how he was related to Moya and Martinez got very nervous. (R. 329:191) 
Shortly after this conversation, Martinez was transferred back to the Metro jail and there 
was no further contact. (R. 329:191) 
This testimony was completely unreliable and therefore does not support a guilty 
verdict. The witness has been convicted of Worker's Compensation fraud, a felony going 
to veracity. Also, this alleged confession was not reported to law enforcement for several 
months after Ashworth encountered Martinez in the holding cell. (R. 329:193). Further, 
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Asnworth was ottered the possibility of relocation expenses if he testified at trial. (R. 
329:195-96) 
The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict 
on the charges of aggravated burglary and murder. The testimony was unreliable and the 
circumstantial evidence inconclusive. Based on the State's evidence at trial, a reasonable 
jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Martinez was responsible for 
the murder of Matthew Moya. Therefore, the jury's guilty verdicts on the charges of 
aggravated assault and murder should be reversed due to an insufficiency of the evidence 
to support the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Angel Martinez was denied his right to due process of the law granted in the 
Constitutions of the United States of America and the State of Utah when the trial court 
admitted the unreliable eyewitness identification of Dikkie Jo Black. This denial of due 
process entitles Martinez to a new trial. 
The Defendant was greatly prejudiced by the hearsay testimony of Anita Archuleta 
at trial that entered as a result of the State's failure to fully comply with the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure governing discovery. The Defendant's Motion for a Mistrial should 
have been granted due to the prejudicial impact of the testimony therefore entitling the 
Defendant to a new trial. 
Finally, the State failed to present reliable and conclusive evidence at trial for 
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which a reasonable jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Martinez was guilty 
of the charges of murder and aggravated burglary. Therefore, the jury's guilty verdict 
should be reversed. 
DATED this *& day of frw^K 2001. 
Gustin, Christian, Skordas, & Caston 
G. Skordas 
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ADDENDUM A 
Gregory G. Skordas (#3865) 
Stephanie Ames (#6466) 
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS 
& CASTON, L.L.C. 
Suite 810 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-7444 
Facsimile: (801)531-8885 
Attorneys for Defendant 
In The Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah 
In and for Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ANGEL JOSEPH MARTINEZ, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS WITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION 
CaseNo.99 1915 895FS 
Judge Lewis 
Defendant, Angel Joseph Martinez, by and through his attorney of record, Stephanie Ames, 
moves this Court to suppress the identification made by Dikkie Joe Black of the defendant, as 
unreliable and therefore in violation of the defendant's right to State due process pursuant to Article 
1 Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Under Article 1 Section 7 of the Utah Constitution "the ultimate question to be determined 
is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable." State v. Ramiez, 
817 P.2d. 774,781 (Utah 1991). In making this determination the Court shall consider the following 
five (5) factors: 
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1. The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; 
2. The witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; 
3. The witness's ability to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental 
acuity; 
4. Whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and 
5. The nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would 
perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the event 
was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the 
race of the actor was same of the observers. Id. 781 f State v. Long. 721 P.2d. 483,493 (Utah 1986)). 
Further, Defendant moves to suppress the evidence of the photo line up as unnecessarily 
suggestive, and therefore giving rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two (2) part test to determine whether a photo ray was 
so suggestive that subsequent admission of eye witness identification at trial would violate due 
process. State v. Thamer. 777 P.2d. 432,435 (Utah 1989). The first part of the Thamertest requires 
a determination of whether the "pretrial photographic procedure used . . . was so suggestive as to 
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. The second part 
dictates that if the photo aray was impermissible suggestive any in court eyewitness identification 
"must be based on an untainted independent foundation to be reliable." Id. 
In this case, the identification made by Dikke Joe Black was unreliable under the totality of 
the circumstances and, therefore, should be suppressed pursuant to Article 1 Section 7 of the Utah 
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Constitution. Further, the photographic aray presented to the Mrs. Dikke Joe Black was so 
impermissible suggestive as to undermine any confidence of any subsequent in court eyewitness 
identification. Defendant, therefore, respectfully requests an evidentiary hearing for this Court to 
determine whether the identification was constitutionally unreliable and whether the photo aray was 
unduly suggestive. 
DATED this */ day of January, 2000. 
GUST/foj, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS & CASTON 
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Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the 
following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt 
of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges 
and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make 
disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such 
information as required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other item of evidence which 
the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before 
trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by 
notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at 
specified reasonable times and places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, 
restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court 
may permit the party to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte 
showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the 
court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a 
party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or 
inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it 
may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
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(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials which 
can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable 
notice of the time and place of such appearance shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure 
of the accused to appear or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of 
the court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may be 
offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence 
concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should 
deem appropriate. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ANGEL JOSEPH MARTINEZ, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Case No. 991915895FS 
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Witness Identification, filed in the above-entitled matter, 
came on for hearing before the Court on January 14, 2000, at 3:00 p.m. Defendant was present 
and represented by counsel, Stephanie Ames, and the State of Utah was represented by Kenneth 
R. Updegrove, Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney. Testimony was received from 
Detective Guy Yoshikawa and Mrs. Dikkie Jo Black. 
The Motion was argued by counsel and submitted to the Court. Being fully advised in 
the premises the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Defendant was charged by Information with Aggravated Burglary and 
Criminal Homicide, Murder, both First Degree Felonies. 
2. That at approximately 3:30 p.m. on August 3, 1999, Mrs. Dikkie Jo Black (Mrs. 
Black) was standing in front of 1494 Dale Avenue, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, 
facing the street. 
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3. That at the above time and place Mrs. Black was picking up her children from her 
babysitter. 
4. That the weather at approximately 3:30 p.m. on August 3, 1999, was hot and the 
sun was bright. 
5. That Mrs. Black does not wear corrective lenses. 
6. That Mrs. Black was not taking any prescription medication. 
7. That Mrs. Black saw two men running northeast on Dale Avenue proceeding 
towards her. 
8. That one of the men was wearing a hooded sweatshirt, which appeared to be 
unusual to Mrs. Black because the day was so hot. 
9. That Mrs. Black also observed an older, two toned green American automobile 
turn the comer onto Dale Avenue and proceed northeast towards where she was standing. 
10. That because the two men and the automobile were proceeding in the same 
direction and with some haste, Mrs. Black initially thought a shooting might occur. 
11. That Mrs. Black observed the driver of the automobile and made eye contact with 
him. 
12. That the window of the automobile, on the driver's side, was down. 
13. That there were no impediments between Mrs. Black and the driver to block her 
view. 
14. That the automobile slowed down sufficiently to allow the two men, who had 
been running, to enter. 
15. That as the two men entered the automobile, Mrs. Black broke eye contact with 
the driver for about a second. 
16. That after the two men entered the automobile, Mrs. Black regained eye contact 
with the driver. 
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17. That Mrs. Black maintained eye contact with the driver as the automobile turned 
left onto Glendale Drive. 
18. That Mrs. Black maintained eye contact with the driver of the automobile for 
approximately 10 to 15 seconds. 
19. That Mrs. Black mainly focused on the driver's eyes while she was observing 
him. 
20. That Mrs. Black learned of the shooting at 1161 South Redwood Drive within 
minutes of the automobile passing by where she had been standing. 
21. That Mrs. Black made contact with the Salt Lake City Police Officers who 
responded to the scene of the shooting. 
22. That Mrs. Black wrote a statement for the police during the afternoon of August 
3,1999. 
23. That Mrs. Black was also interviewed by the police that day. 
24. That Mrs. Black described the driver as appearing to be 18 to 25 years old, a 
Hispanic male, with smooth skin and white teeth. 
25. That during the afternoon of August 5, 1999, Detective Guy Yoshikawa 
(Detective Yoshikawa) went to Mrs. Black's home to present her with a photographic spread to 
see if she might be able to identify the driver of the automobile who passed by her on August 3, 
1999. 
26. That prior to going to Mrs. Black's home, Detective Yoshikawa telephoned Mrs. 
Black and asked if there was a possibility that the driver might be older than 18 to 25 years old. 
27. That Mrs. Black told Detective Yoshikawa that there was a good possibility that 
the driver could be older. 
28. That Detective Yoshikawa prepared a photo spread to show Mrs. Black. 
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29. That Detective Yoshikawa prepared a photo spread of six Hispanic males between 
the ages of approximately 30 to 37, with the aid of a computer. 
30. That defendant was included in the photo spread. 
31. That the other five males resembled defendant. 
32. That the photographs of all six males were in color. 
33. That the photo spread was printed in color on a single sheet of photographic 
paper. 
34. That a larger black and white copy of the photo spread was also prepared. 
35. That before Detective Yoshikawa presented the photo spread to Mrs. Black, he 
informed her that the males in the photo spread would appear to be older than the age description 
she had given the police. 
36. That Detective Yoshikawa informed Mrs. Black that the driver of the automobile 
may or may not be included in the photo spread. 
37. That Detective Yoshikawa did not suggest anyone in the photo spread, to Mrs. 
Black, as the driver of the automobile. 
38. That Detective Yoshikawa did not help Mrs. Black make a selection from the 
photo spread. 
39. That Detective Yoshikawa told Mrs. Black to take her time as she viewed the 
photo spread and to look at each individual photograph. 
40. That Mrs. Black was not compelled to make an identification from the photo 
spread. 
41. That after Mrs. Black viewed the photo spread, Detective Yoshikawa gave her a 
black and white copy of the spread itself. 
42. That Mrs. Black circled a photograph on the copy of the photo spread and fixed 
her signature thereto. 
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43. That Mrs. Black, circled the photograph of defendant as the driver of the 
automobile. 
44. That Mrs. Black told Detective Yoshikawa that she was not certain that the 
photograph she selected was that of the driver of the automobile. 
45. That Mrs. Black told Detective Yoshikawa of some similarities between the driver 
and the photograph and one dissimilarity. 
46. That Mrs. Black told Detective Yoshikawa that defendant's photograph and the 
driver had a similar hairline and eyes but the driver's facial skin appeared to be smoother than 
that in the photograph. 
47. That Mrs. Black stated the driver's eyes did not seem to match each other. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes as a matter of law, that: 
1. The manner in which the photo spread was prepared by Detective Yoshikawa and 
presented to Mrs. Black establishes that it was not unduly suggestive. 
01)073 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo.991915895FS 
Page 6 
2. Under the totality of the circumstances, the identification of the driver by Mrs. 
Black is reliable. 
DATED this//? day of _ ^ ^ M f _ r 2 0 0 p . 
BY THECOURT: } 
^NOKX^E^ESLIE A. LEWIS 
Third District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Stephanie Ames 
Counsel for Defendant 
S* 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law was placed with the U.S. Postal Service postage prepaid, and addressed to 
Stephanie Ames, counsel for Defendant Angel Joseph Martinez, at Gustin, Christian, Skordas & 
Caston, Suite 810 Boston Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the fV^ 
day of February, 2000. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, 4931 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 1S 2000 
SALT, 
By. w^m ITY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ANGEL JOSEPH MARTINEZ, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
CaseNo.991915895FS 
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis 
The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law and having entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law based thereon; 
HEREBY ORDERS that defendant's Motion to Suppress Witness Identification is 
denied. 
DATED this "day of 
Y THE COURT: 
HONORABLE LESLIE A!. LEWIS 
Third District Court Judge 
ADDENDUM D 
Gregory G. Skordas (#3865) 
Rebecca C. Hyde (#6409) 
WATKISS & SKORDAS, P.C. 
The Broadway Centre, Suite 800 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304 
Telephone: (801)530-1500 
Facsimile: (801)530-1520 
Attorneys for Defendant 
In the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah 
In and for Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ANGEL JOSEPH MARTINEZ, 
Defendant. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
CaseNo.99 1915 895FS 
Judge Anthony Quinn 
Angel Joseph Martinez, the Defendant herein, by and through the undersigned attorney, 
Rebecca C. Hyde, and pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure hereby 
requests disclosure of the following material or information: 
1. Relevant written or recorded statements of the Defendant; 
2. The criminal record of the Defendant; 
3. Physical evidence seized from the Defendant; 
0 0 0 1 ^ 
4. Evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, 
mitigate the guilt of the Defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; 
5. A list of all the witnesses that the State intends to call for trial in the above-
entitled matter, their addresses and telephone numbers; 
6. Any recordings, reports, transcripts, or reports about statements in possession of 
any member, or group involved in the prosecution or the investigation of the above-entitled case 
taken from the witnesses listed in paragraph 5 above, and 
7. Any other item of evidence which the Court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the Defendant in order for the Defendant to adequately prepare his 
defense. 
The Defendant further requests that an order issue compelling production of the foregoing 
and that the disclosure be made as soon as practicable. Further, that the Court order that the 
State of Utah has a continuing duty to make this disclosure. 
DATED this / £ day of August, 1999. 
WATKISS & SKORDAS, P.C. 
Rebecca C. 
2 oooi-: 
